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INTRODUCTION
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have inaugurated a golden
age for tradition-based arguments in constitutional law. All of
the Justices consider such arguments, and several are amateur
historians who have centered their jurisprudence on what con-
stitutional traditions require of us today. Such arguments are the
primary legal basis for whole areas of constitutional law, includ-
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ing presidential powers, state immunity, anti-commandeering
limits on congressional authority, and the rights to privacy, to
keep and bear arms, to habeas corpus, and to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment. Other areas of constitutional law,
such as equal protection and free speech, are not dominated by
these arguments today but might be in the future.
Arguments from tradition raise a central conundrum. Law-
yers and judges tend to interpret "tradition" statically and in-
strumentally, to mean legal practices or norms that have perse-
vered over a long period of time and that provide stable
meaning that can be used to resolve a legal issue. The static un-
derstanding is related to the instrumental use, because lawyers
and judges prefer simplicity to complexity. In contrast, histori-
ans approach tradition dynamically and non-instrumentally, to
mean legal practices or norms that as a general principle have
persevered in some ways and evolved in others. Tradition is
rarely simple and univocal; it is multifarious, evolving, and
complicated. This understanding creates problems for the
judge wielding tradition instrumentally. That tradition is
evolving creates risks of anachronism, where the interpreter
reads his own values and viewpoint back into the past. That
tradition is multifarious creates risks of cherry-picking, where
the interpreter (unconsciously) manipulates tradition by focus-
ing on features she finds congenial and ignoring the rest and
by interrogating that fragmentary tradition with loaded ques-
tions. That tradition is complicated creates risks of illegitimacy,
where the interpreter's misinterpretation or manipulation im-
poses duties or creates rights that obstruct the needed projects
and experiments of current legislatures.
This Essay uses case studies of sodomy and gun litigation to
explore three values that lawyers and judges find in tradition,
and also to understand those values critically, from a histo-
rian's point of view. Tradition shall be examined as evidence of
original meaning, constitutional adverse possession, and pre-
cepts conformed by democratic deliberation. Each of these de-
ployments of tradition is subject to the anachronism, cherry-
picking, and illegitimacy problems identified above. In my
view, the most problematic use of tradition is the first, tradition
as evidence of original meaning. The best legal theory for tradi-
tion in constitutional law is the third, tradition as democratic
deliberation. The third theory is the one that most respects the
historian's dynamic point of view; it can enlighten the inter-
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preter and alter his views about contested matters. This theory
provides plausible defenses not only for a laudable Supreme
Court decision, but also for two other decisions whose out-
comes are questionable.
I. TRADITION KNOWN TO THE FRAMERS AS EVIDENCE OF
ORIGINAL MEANING
The Supreme Court and many commentators believe that a
constitutional provision's original meaning is determinative of
or relevant to its modern interpretation. If the Constitution is a
social contract among Us the People, whose terms dictate the
governance structure and some fundamental untrumpable val-
ues of our polity, then the shared understanding of what those
terms meant is relevant when we are later called upon to apply
and interpret the Constitution.1 Traditions that can be traced
back to the framing eras can be a valuable aid in that process of
interpretation. Take the Bill of Rights (1791) and the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868). The original meaning of their terms can be
usefully understood by reference to traditions that would have
been known to the Framers, the ratifying legislatures, and the
citizens of those eras.
Assume, as the Court has long assumed, that the liberty pro-
tection of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments includes a substantive element: There are some
liberties for which the state must provide a compelling justifi-
cation for the deprivation not to be arbitrary (the ultimate "due
process" protection). 2 Almost every state action deprives some
persons of liberty in the abstract, yet it would be absurd to ago-
nize over all of these liberty deprivations; thus, only the most
serious deprivations trigger constitutional concerns. Which lib-
erty deprivations trigger such concerns is a matter of impor-
tance. Liberties long understood as important when a constitu-
tional provision was adopted are potentially important clues as
to original meaning. There are, however, huge epistemic diffi-
1. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 143-45, 154-55 (1990).
2. Some early sources include Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and THO-
MAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Victor H.
Lane ed., Little, Brown 1903) (1868).
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culties in coming up with the proper list of liberties. First, the
Framers and ratifiers debated issues at a high level of general-
ity and did not say much about specific liberty issues. Second,
even when a Framer or ratifier said something specific and
relevant to the issue, it is hard to generalize that person's stated
(and sincere?) views to the population of ratifiers and citizenry.
And, third, discussions so long ago (1791 and 1868) operated
under very different assumptions about human needs, social
policy, science, and so on, and might not be easily transferred
to issues today without some interpolation.3
Consider Justice White's opinion for the Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick.4 The issue was whether Georgia's sodomy law could
be applied to oral sex in a private apartment between consent-
ing adults-here, two men-without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty protection. Sodomy never came up in the
congressional or state ratifying debates, but Justice White and
those Justices who wrote concurring opinions got around this
difficulty by reference to tradition: Because Anglo-American
law at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) had long
prohibited the "crime against nature,"5 and because these laws
and their moral foundations would have been well-known to
the Framers and ratifiers, the Bowers majority presumed that
homosexual sodomy cannot be a "liberty" given extra protec-
tion by the Due Process Clause.6 That the anti-homosexual tra-
dition embedded in Anglo-American law and society had
flourished during the twentieth century also enabled the major-
ity Justices to conclude, without any evidence in the record,
that citizens of Georgia intended their gender-neutral sodomy
law to reflect an anti-homosexual morality, which was a ra-
tional basis to sustain the law.7 At each stage of analysis, his-
3. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 214-21, 229-31 (1980); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of
Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1073-75, 1087-93
(1990); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-804 (1983).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *215).
6. Id. at 192-94 (majority opinion).
7. Id. at 196 (affirming as a rational basis for the state law "the presumed belief
of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable"). It should be noted that Georgia never had a sodomy law that fo-
cused on "homosexual conduct."
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torical tradition enabled the Court to resolve matters of uncer-
tainty about language, public intentions, and constitutional pur-
pose.
Tradition also provided a limiting principle for the case-by-
case elaboration of the constitutional privacy right that the
Court had creatively teased out of the Due Process Clause. Jus-
tice White emphasized this, too, in his opinion. Because the
specification of due process liberty to provide special protec-
tions for people's privacy against state invasion did not have
concrete support in the constitutional text or framing discus-
sions, an expansive view of privacy would imperil the Court's
legitimacy as the enforcer of a strict rule of law.
8
Unfortunately, Bowers, the exemplar of a tradition-based ju-
risprudence of original meaning, also illustrates the limitations
or pitfalls of such a jurisprudence in the hands of lawyers and
judges.9 Because originalist scholars and judges seek stability
and closure from history and tradition, they easily fall prey to
criticism that their enterprise is anachronistic, ahistorical "law
office history" 10 rather than a genuine historical exploration of
the norms, vocabulary, and world of the Framers. 1 "Tradition"
is both dynamic and plastic, and that means that its deploy-
ment requires a high level of expertise and historicity, scrupu-
lousness, and prudence. Bowers is a case where the Justices
flunked this standard rather dramatically.
A. Anachronism: The Changed Circumstances Problem
One problem with using tradition to figure out original
meaning is changed circumstances: The practices, laws, and
even vocabulary familiar to the Framers often reflect a world-
view very different from our own. Has the interpreter under-
8. Id. at 194-95; accord Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding
assisted suicide ban upon a similar tradition-based theory).
9. Justice White's account is hardly idiosyncratic to that Justice, for it draws
heavily from the Brief of Petitioner at 21-26, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), and
from Judge Bork's opinion in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (refusing "to protect from regulation a form of behavior never before pro-
tected, and indeed traditionally condemned").
10. Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understand-
ing, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2098 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutional-
ism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
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stood the circumstances of the past and applied its lessons de-
fensibly to a modem problem?
The majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick was a clumsy ef-
fort in this respect. Hardwick and another man were arrested
for engaging in oral sex, which Justice White treated as the
kind of "homosexual sodomy" that the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment would have understood as a longstanding
and notorious crime in 1868. Yet an actual American lawyer in
1868 would have had no idea what "homosexual" meant; the
word was not coined until the end of the nineteenth century, 12
and no American sodomy law homed in on "homosexual sod-
omy" until 1969, fully a century after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified. 13 If Justice White had explained that homo-
sexual sodomy simply meant oral sex between two persons of
the same sex, the 1868 lawyer would have remained somewhat
baffled, for sodomy laws did not cover oral sex, another term
Justice White might have been required to explain. Not a single
American jurisdiction in 1868 identified oral sex as sodomy or a
crime against nature, and the English authorities and American
treatises all explicitly excluded oral sex from criminal prohibi-
tions. 14 A learned lawyer could have told Justice White what
"sodomy" was: It was anal rape by a man against another man,
a boy, a woman, a girl, or an animal. 5 Except for a 1656 law in
the New Haven Colony, sex of any kind between two women
was never sodomy or a crime against nature in the pre-1868
Anglo-American tradition. 16
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, sodomy
laws were updated in most states to include oral sex (though
12. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
13. For a survey of state sodomy laws, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHON-
ORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-2003, at 387-407 (2008). The
first state law limited to same-sex (homosexual) activities was 1969 Kan. Laws ch.
180, § 21-3505.
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
631, 655-56, 667 (collecting references to treatises and English case law as to the
ambit of sodomy and crime against nature laws); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 13,
at 387-407 (appendix identifying when each state expanded its sodomy law to
include oral sex).
15. See R v. Jacobs, (1817) 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B.); R v. Wiseman, (1716) 92 Eng.
Rep. 774, 774-75 (K.B.); see also EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF
THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 59 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644).
16. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 16-23.
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usually not oral sex between two women), and enforcement of
new oral sex bans in the twentieth century was overwhelm-
ingly against men seeking or having sex with other men.
17 In a
century when huge majorities of heterosexual married couples
engaged in oral (and many in anal) sex to spice up their mar-
riages, Americans culturally erased the generalized wording of
sodomy laws and assumed that the real targets were homo-
sexuals, people whose characteristic (rather than episodic) sex-
ual activity was "unnatural" (that is, not procreative penile-
vaginal sex). 18 Justice White had so thoroughly assimilated this
cultural understanding that he assumed it is transhistorical and
universal. It is not.
B. Cherry-Picking Problems: How Is Tradition
Interrogated and Weighed?
Bowers v. Hardwick also illustrates the richness and the poten-
tial plasticity of tradition. Even if a modern interpreter can
truly understand the traditions of the past, "using" them to cre-
ate constitutional lines raises cherry-picking problems for any
but the most scrupulous interpreter. Where a constitutional
case raises issues that go to the heart of people's emotional or
cognitive commitments, as homosexuality did in 1986, no in-
terpreter is capable of being entirely scrupulous. With so much
richness and detail, using tradition in Bowers was like looking
out over a crowd and picking out your friends (to borrow from
Judge Harold Leventhal). 19
1. Multiple Traditions and the Level of Generality Problem
Tradition is multifarious: Our country enjoys many different
traditions, and more than one tradition might be relevant to a
constitutional inquiry. Tradition is also amorphous and can be
identified and characterized at various levels of generality. To
justify protection for Hardwick's activities as protected "lib-
erty," Justice White demanded that Hardwick establish a long-
standing tradition protecting "homosexual sodomy."20 As Jus-
17. See id. at 49-59, 85-99.
18. See id. at 76-84.
19. The Leventhal quip was made in connection with the use of legislative his-
tory. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 36 (1997).
20. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-95 (1986).
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tice Blackmun pointed out, that was an unfairly specific in-
quiry. 21 Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against state
wiretaps require the citizen to show a longstanding tradition
protecting telephone use? But Justice Blackmun was slanted in
the other direction: All Hardwick had to establish was long-
standing tradition protecting intimate relations within the
home, and his own private activities were protected. 2 Does the
right to privacy protect the man who has intimate relations
with a female minor, simply because such relations are impor-
tant to each of those persons and occurred within the home?
2. What Counts as Tradition?
In constructing an account of tradition, all the Bowers Justices
focused just on legal sources. Because there are a lot of sources
for guidance on the legal tradition, judgment about what
should be consulted and what should be counted is often sub-
jective. And that creates additional cherry-picking problems.
For example, Justice White treated crime-against-nature laws as
a tradition of illegality for consensual, private sodomy; he as-
sumed that generally phrased laws applied to consensual ac-
tivities. 23 Because such a broad reading cut against the public
justification for such laws, I examined their pattern of enforce-
ment during the nineteenth century and found a focus on non-
consensual or public activities, and sometimes both.
24
This is a more thorough methodology, but is it a better one?
That really depends on how the interpreter defines tradition. If
it is only the announced, public understandings of our society's
governing norms, then some of my evidence is irrelevant. If
tradition also includes the practical application and day-to-day
operation of announced norms, then my evidence is relevant
but should be supplemented.
25
21. See id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 204-08.
23. Id. at 192-94 (majority opinion).
24. Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (with appendix listing all reported
nineteenth-century American sodomy decisions); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 156-66, 374-75 (1999).
25. Thus, one might examine municipal records describing the exact circum-
stances for every sodomy arrest in some major cities, to see if sodomy laws were
ever applied to private relations between consenting adults. Cf. William E. Nelson,
Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power in Colonial Pennsylvania, 59
200 [Vol. 32
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3. Burden of Proof?
In Lawrence v. Texas, which overruled Bowers, both Justice
Kennedy and Justice Scalia relied on my examination of the
practical application of sodomy laws to figure out what a tradi-
tion-based original meaning might be for "liberty."26 The Jus-
tices, however, asked different questions of tradition. Writing for
the Court, Justice Kennedy asked whether there was a long-
standing and well-known tradition excluding gay people's pri-
vate intimacies from the liberty assured all other Americans for
their intimate relationships: There was not.27 Writing for the dis-
senters, Justice Scalia posed a very different question, whether
the homosexual defendants had demonstrated an affirmative pro-
tection for "homosexual sodomy" in nineteenth-century Amer-
ica: assuredly not.28 Depending on how you phrase the question,
the same evidence can support different conclusions.
Underlying Justice Scalia's interrogation was strong skepti-
cism toward the privacy precedents.2 9 Underlying Justice Ken-
nedy's interrogation was an acceptance of the privacy cases,
and a baseline assumption that gay people are decent, normal
Americans. Justice Scalia: Have the homosexuals shown me
that tradition affirmatively protects them? Justice Kennedy:
Why shouldn't lesbian and gay Americans enjoy the same pri-
vacy as straight ones?
C. Illegitimacy Problems
An early Supreme Court sexual relations precedent is
McLaughlin v. Florida,30 which invalidated a statute making it a
crime for persons of different races to cohabit openly. Justice
White's opinion for the Court relied on the Equal Protection
Clause rather than a due process privacy right to scuttle the
SMU L. REV. 3, 44 (2006) (finding no convictions for "sodomy" in colonial Penn-
sylvania's courthouse records).
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-72 (Kennedy, J., for the Court) (relying on Eskridge,
Hardwick and Historiography, supra note 14, at 656, and the Cato Amicus Brief, supra
note 24, at 16-17, and replicating chunks of the amicus brief's analysis); id. at 597-98
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on ESKRIDGE, supra note 24, at 159, 375).
27. See id. at 567-68, 571-72 (majority opinion).
28. See id. at 596-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. For a biting attack on the privacy right, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
30. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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law, but there were much better tradition-based arguments
supporting the Florida cohabitation law than there were for
applying Georgia's sodomy law to consensual activities in Bow-
ers twenty-three years later. Not only did northern as well as
southern states bar different-race marriages and relationships
all over the country during Reconstruction, but the supporters
of Reconstruction-era civil rights laws and the Fourteenth
Amendment repeatedly disavowed any protection for inter-
racial sexuality or marriage. 31 Pace v. Alabama32 enshrined their
understanding in binding precedent.
Justice White was aware of these tradition-based arguments,
as were colleagues such as Justices Black and Harlan, both his-
toricists guided by tradition in much of their constitutional ju-
risprudence. Nevertheless, Justice White ignored tradition al-
most entirely in his opinion interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause. 33 No one dissented.34 Even most strict constructionists
have failed to quarrel with McLaughlin, because original his-
torical meaning cannot be the end of the inquiry in the race
cases. American traditions of race, including slavery and apart-
heid, were not only morally questionable, but also politically
risky. "The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indis-
solubly linked together, and the interests of both require that
the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of
race hate to be planted under the sanction of law." 35
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the legitimacy of consti-
tutional law, even as applied by judges, is not just the applica-
tion of original meaning or other legal sources to announce a
constitutional rule. It also involves the ongoing evolution of
our pluralistic society. Notice that society's evolution will also
affect tradition itself, which on matters of sexuality as well as
race has been evolutive and not static.
31. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
DUKE L.J. 624, 656-57; see also Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Four-
teenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966).
32. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
33. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188-90 (discussing Pace and dismissing it as "repre-
sent[ing] a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood
analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court").
34. Two Justices went further than Justice White in disapproving race-based clas-
sifications. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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II. POST-ADOPTION TRADITION AS CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVERSE POSSESSION
In District of Columbia v. Heller,36 the Supreme Court for the
first time in its history struck down a law as inconsistent with
the Second Amendment, which states: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
37 Heller recognized
and enforced a right for "law-abiding" citizens to possess and
use handguns and perhaps other firearms within the home for
self-defense. 38 This holding was in tension with the text of the
Second Amendment and precedent. According to professional
linguists and historians, in the eighteenth century "bear arms"
almost always meant to use weapons in a military context; hence,
the Second Amendment's "original meaning" was to allow citi-
zens to "keep" military weapons insofar as needed to "bear" them
in military service.39 Consistent with that reading of the operative
clause's words (italicized above), the prefatory clause's emphasis
on a citizen militia seems to limit the Second Amendment right
"to keep and bear Arms." The Heller Court's broader construc-
tion of the operative clause leaves the prefatory clause as surplu-
sage having no legal consequences, contrary to the canon pre-
suming that every clause in the Constitution adds something to its
interpretation. The broad reading is also contrary to the Court's
only significant Second Amendment precedent, Miller v. United
States,40 where a unanimous Court limited the Second Amend-
ment right by tying it to militia service.
41
Speaking for the Court, however, Justice Scalia read the
Amendment more broadly than the text and precedent would
36. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
38. 128 S. Ct. at 2821-22.
39. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron, Ph.D., et al.
in Support of Petitioners at 18-28, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290); Saul Cornell,
The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD.
L. REV. 150, 163-64 (2007) (survey of 115 late-eighteenth-century texts using term
"bear arms"); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Consti-
tutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 618 (2000) (same result for Library of Con-
gress database, 1774-1821). Justice Scalia responded that "keep and bear arms"
has a broader meaning than "bear arms." Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792-94. But see id. at
2827-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (responding to Justice Scalia).
40. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
41. Id. at 178.
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suggest, and to do so he relied heavily on tradition as evidence
of original meaning.42 He started with England's Declaration of
Rights: "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms
for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by
Law." 43 According to Justice Scalia, eighteenth-century Eng-
lishmen believed that an armed citizenry, whether presented as
a militia or not, was a bulwark against tyranny; the monarchy
would think twice before riling a citizenry that could shoot
back.44 The colonists insisted upon this right in the 1760s and
1770s, when George III sought "to disarm the inhabitants of the
most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by
Americans invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A
New York article of April 1769 said that '[i]t is a natural right
which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the
Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence."'
45
Tradition also helped Justice Scalia respond to the textual
argument that "bear arms" had a military meaning in the
eighteenth century and to the argument that the drafting his-
tory of the Second Amendment was focused only on militia
service. 46 Justice Scalia used tradition to shift the burden of
proof: Unless there is clear evidence otherwise, any text guar-
anteeing a right to keep and bear arms is presumptively con-
nected to the traditional right. A decisive answer to the Dis-
trict's (and Miller's) view that the Second Amendment's right
was limited to militia use was that it would "treat the Federal
Second Amendment as an odd outlier, protecting a right un-
known in state constitutions or at English common law."
47
42. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-802 (Scalia, J., for the Court) (original meaning of
Second Amendment's text); id. at 2797-99 (tradition-based evidence confirming
and deepening linguistic evidence of original meaning).
43. 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2.
44. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797-99; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Academics for the
Second Amendment in Support of the Respondent [Ratification and Original Pub-
lic Meaning] at 14-17, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290) (developing this point in
greater detail).
45. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799. For many other examples, see Respondent's Brief at
9-14, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290); Brief of the Cato Institute and History
Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent [The Right
Inherited from England] at 12-16, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290).
46. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2827-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (original linguistic
meaning of "keep and bear arms"); id. at 2831-36 (drafting, debating, and ratifica-
tion history of the Second Amendment).
47. Id. at 2803 (majority opinion).
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Perhaps recognizing that his account of original meaning was
highly controversial (and substantially rejected by professional
linguists and historians), Justice Scalia added a discussion of
public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms after
1791-a period the professional linguists and historians failed to
cover in their submissions to the Court. Justice Scalia relied on
lower-court interpretations of the Second Amendment, post-
1791 state constitutions and their application by state courts, and
treatises and commentaries to buttress his reading of the Second
Amendment. 48 "[T]he examination of a variety of legal and
other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal
text in the period after its enactment or ratification" is, he says,
"a critical tool of constitutional interpretation. ' 49 This is an im-
portant point-but not because subsequent practice is evidence
of "original" meaning.
50
There is a second constitutional value for tradition: It can be
a pragmatic source for filling in details left unanswered by the
open texture of the Constitution. 51 Assume that the Second
Amendment is ambiguous about whether it entails an individ-
ual right to possess guns in the home for self-defense. Post-
adoption tradition can settle this ambiguity by coming down
strongly on one side or the other. Although unpersuaded of the
textual ambiguity, I agree with Justice Scalia that this material
can have legal bite. Consider an analogy from contract law: If
the parties' practice supports a particular interpretation of an
ambiguous contract provision, that practice is legally relevant
and usually decisive in fixing the meaning of the contract.52 Or
property law: If one party openly and notoriously occupies an-
other's property for a long period of time (the traditional rule is
20 years), the other party is deemed to have acquiesced in a
formal shift in property rights. 53These different doctrines point
in the same direction for post-adoption constitutional consen-
48. Id. at 2805-12.
49. Id. at 2805.
50. See id. at 2809-11 (discussing Second Amendment rights of freed slaves in
the 1860s, which were "instructive").
51. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-88 (1981) (taking ex-
pansive view of Presidential power to suspend lawsuits against foreign states,
based on executive practice to which Congress never objected).
52. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "course
of performance").
53. See generally id. at 59 (defining "adverse possession").
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sus: It can settle issues left ambiguous by the Framers, and al-
low citizens and institutions to plan their affairs with reliance
on such settled understandings.
Tradition as constitutional adverse possession is subject to
some of the same kinds of analytical pitfalls and normative
qualms as tradition as evidence of original meaning. Justice
Scalia's opinion in Heller is a classic example of the pitfalls as
well as the appeal of tradition along these lines.
A. Anachronism
Although Bowers remains the champion of judicial anachro-
nism, even the better-informed analysis in Heller is frequently
anachronistic. Anachronism leaps off the early pages of Justice
Scalia's opinion, when he relies on the broad meaning of "bear
arms" today and imputes that meaning back to the eighteenth
century.5 4 That the anachronisms come in a well-researched
opinion is evidence of the inherent trickiness of tradition as an
interpretive source, as judges and lawyers tend to shoehorn
complicated, shifting understandings into simpler categories
and boxes. And when emotional public policy issues are at
stake, normative precommitments drive the shoehorning. 55
A striking feature of Justice Scalia's opinion is obliviousness
to the fact that the United States changed dramatically between
1791 and 2008. When the Second Amendment was adopted,
ninety-six percent of Americans lived in small towns or rural
areas, often on the frontier between European areas and Native
American lands, and there were only six cities with more than
10,000 people. 56 In such an agrarian frontier culture, guns were
typically needed for a family's economic success and often
their survival against attack; the community protected itself
through armed citizen militias. As our country urbanized, the
memory of a citizen militia evanesced, and the notion of an
54. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793-94 (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,
143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). Justice Scalia was being playful, tweaking
Justice Ginsburg for taking a narrower view of "bear arms" in Heller than she did
in the earlier case. Very clever, but it is still an anachronism.
55. This is what a recent empirical analysis found when it examined the Justices'
deployment of sources from the Founding era in constitutional federalism cases.
Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for
Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 282-83 (2004).
56. THOMAS BENDER, TOWARD AN URBAN VISION: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 3 (1975) (data as of 1800).
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armed citizenry as the best protection against tyranny became
incomprehensible to some. Today, America is an urban society
where guns are part of an escalating culture of violence; the
community protects itself through armed police forces. There is
a fierce public policy debate about the efficacy of gun control
laws, especially for urban jurisdictions like the District that are
surrounded by states where guns can be easily obtained. Was
there consensus in the nineteenth century, as the United States
was becoming more urban and industrialized, that the militia-
based Second Amendment right ought to be expanded (and
contracted) to become a right of self-defense in the home? Was
this consensus carried over into the twentieth century? Justice
Scalia ignores these questions, whose answers might be "yes"
(and therefore supportive of his position), and instead treats
the post-adoption materials as simply a continuation of what
he thinks (based on slender evidence) all Americans believed
during the Founding generation. Such a static understanding is
the epitome of anachronism. 57
B. Cherry-Picking
Tradition is malleable in the hands of the Heller Justices, as
suggested by the foregoing analysis, and that leads to cherry-
picking charges by both sides of the debate. A big definitional
problem for post-adoption tradition is what to do about the
abandonment of an earlier tradition? Once the citizen-militia
ideal died, the minority notion of an individual's enforceable
right to bear arms receded if not disappeared. 58 In 1927, Con-
57. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, "Don't Know Much About History": The Current Crisis in
Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657, 675 (2002). Justice Scalia's
majority opinion also contains smaller anachronisms that undermine his argu-
ment on its own terms. Observing that nine states adopted constitutional protec-
tions for the right to keep and bear arms between 1789 and 1820, he says this evi-
dence confirms a broad original meaning for the Second Amendment: to protect
guns for self-defense as well as militia use. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2803. But seven of
the nine state constitutional provisions assured the right to "bear arms in defence
of themselves [or himself] and the State," broader language than the Second
Amendment's text. Id. If the Second Amendment were as broad as Justice Scalia
says it is, why did these post-1791 state constitutions not just copy the Second
Amendment? Possibly, the states in question wanted a broader protection than
the militia-dependent protection of the Second Amendment. As a matter of tex-
tual plain meaning, one would expect the Second Amendment to be construed
more narrowly than these broader provisions.
58. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2842-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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gress prohibited mail delivery of "pistols, revolvers, and other
firearms capable of being concealed on the person, ' ' 9 and then,
in 1934, restricted the possession of sawed-off shotguns and
machine guns.60 Congress "infringed" the individual right "to
keep and bear arms" if the latter language is read broadly and
unconnected to the militia setting of the prefatory clause. Mu-
nicipal, state, and federal legislatures have also enacted in-
creasingly-regulatory gun control measures.6' Under these cir-
cumstances, tradition as adverse possession cuts in favor of the
Heller dissenters as much as the majority: even if nineteenth-
century tradition supports a broad reading of the Second
Amendment, twentieth-century tradition goes the other way.
An internal analysis of Justice Scalia's opinion illustrates the
malleability of tradition. What the "traditional" right to bear
arms actually entailed varies dramatically from point to point
in his opinion.62 And few if any of the sources of what the
Court considered tradition understood the right in precisely
the way the Heller Court did. Justice Scalia stated that his read-
ing protected a law-abiding individual's "right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation." 6' That is much
broader than the 1689 English Declaration of Rights, with its
"as allowed by Law" check,64 and it is narrower than the 1776
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, which protected "a right to
bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state."
65 In-
deed, Justice Scalia's announced right has no connection with
the actual text of the Second Amendment, even if the prefatory
clause is rendered legally irrelevant. Neither the lower court
nor any party to the case had argued for the precise definition
of the right rendered by Justice Scalia. This odd rendition sug-
gests that the nation's leading textualist and most ardent tradi-
tionalist had to compromise with his more evolutive Brethren
in order to secure a Court majority. What was going on?
59. Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 75, 44 Stat. 1059.
60. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2000)).
61. Amici Curiae Brief of District Attorneys in Support of Petitioners at 7-9,
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290) (discussing firearms-regulating ordinances and
statutes in the United States).
62. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792-99.
63. Id. at 2797.
64. 1689, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2.
65. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § XIII.
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C. Illegitimacy
A legitimacy problem with tradition as constitutional ad-
verse possession is that it potentially clashes with more con-
crete legal sources -constitutional text and structure, drafting
and ratifying history, and binding precedent. The plasticity of
tradition in the hands of a skilled jurist or advocate (sometimes
the same person) can be deployed not only in a result-oriented
way, but also to destabilize what appear to be "harder" sources
of law. Thus, Justice Scalia skillfully marginalizes the Second
Amendment's prefatory clause because taking it seriously
would render the Second Amendment an "outlier" in that era.
But the Second Amendment was an outlier if you take its text
and drafting history seriously: It reflected the Virginia (George
Mason and James Madison) approach to militia insurance.
66
Likewise, Justice Scalia's deployment of tradition radically re-
vises Miller, reducing its holding about the relationships of the
prefatory clause to the operative clause to dictum and essen-
tially limiting that precedent to its facts. 67 This is adverse pos-
session with a cutting edge.
For those concerned about "judicial activism," where judges
read their own preferences into constitutional provisions in or-
der to trump democratic regulation, Justice Scalia's tradition-
saturated opinion in Heller ought to be a matter of concern.
Heller rewrote the Constitution. In Heller, the Second Amend-
ment not only loses the prefatory clause, but gains new nontex-
tual limitations on the right. The Heller Second Amendment
effectively now reads: "The right of law-abiding people to keep
Arms in their homes, for self-defense purposes, shall not be
subjected to unreasonable regulation. ' 68 Such a drastic revision
requires a lot more explanation than the Court provides.
III. TRADITION AS DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
There is a third way of understanding "tradition" in constitu-
tional interpretation that better reflects the learning of profes-
sional historians and engages the Supreme Court in a more
productive dialogue with the democratic process. Many Su-
66. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2835 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2845-46.
68. See id. at 2822 (majority opinion).
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preme Court opinions explicitly or implicitly comprehend tra-
dition the way historians do-as an evolving interaction
among norms, institutions, and practices. The most famous ex-
pression is Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,69 an early
privacy case. He was guided by the "balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing."7° Justice
Harlan's understanding of the living and evolving traditions of
American law is inspired by the common law methodology
itself, and perhaps also by the philosophy of Edmund Burke. 71
An evolutive approach to tradition in constitutional law
ameliorates the anachronism problems examined here but does
not solve the cherry-picking or illegitimacy problems. Indeed,
this kind of approach drives traditionalists like Justice Scalia
absolutely crazy, because they do not see how an evolving or
living tradition can have any coherence, and certainly cannot
see how it could provide guidance for judges or attorneys. This
is a fair point and can be illustrated by reference to both sod-
omy and guns. The Lawrence majority and the Heller dissenters
would understand tradition as evolving away from old-
fashioned agrarian values, the values held by most colonial and
post-Independence Americans. The norms dominating early
American public law included notions that sexual urges should
be channeled into procreative marriages, that a man's home is
his castle governed by his directives, and that every man
should have guns and other weapons to defend his home and
family. That America is long gone, and the norms for a mod-
ern, urbanized America include notions that citizens have a
wide array of sexual and relationship choices, that a man or
woman's condo is a presumptively private space, and that po-
lice are the primary source of protection against malefactors,
who should be disarmed by the state if possible.
This is not, however, the only story that could be told about
an evolving tradition. Another account supports Bowers and
Heller. The United States has changed, and most Americans to-
69. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
70. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Justice Harlan).
71. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
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day do not follow any of those norms that dominated early
American public law: They do not limit their sexual activities to
procreative marital sex and they view guns in the home as dan-
gers to children. This is a shift in practices and majority beliefs,
but it has not obliterated the old traditions that made this coun-
try exceptional and great. For this reason, there has been a vig-
orous revival of traditional values-procreative marriage and
guns as the citizen's first line of self-defense-in America. 72 If
this country enjoys an "evolving [living] tradition," then Rev-
erend Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority, Phyllis Schlafly
and Stop ERA, and Charlton Heston and the NRA may be just
as important leaders and institutions as Margaret Sanger and
Planned Parenthood, the women's liberation of Betty Friedan,
and the gun-control movement led by Sarah and James Brady.
In short, if academic and judicial critics of a stability-oriented
tradition want to insist on a more complicated understanding
of tradition as evolutive, they have to grapple with genuine
complexity. Once tradition is understood critically and evolut-
ively, cherry-picking problems become even more abundant
than before, unfortunately. There is a third way of conceptual-
izing tradition that helps us answer this question in a more re-
sponsible way. This approach to tradition not only avoids most
problems of anachronism, but also reduces the illegitimacy
problems. The third approach is tradition as ongoing democratic
deliberation. In our democratic constitutionalism the authorita-
tive value of tradition is greatest when it is recognized and
elaborated by legislatures after open and public deliberation. If
the institutions of democratic governance, with popular feed-
back, reaffirm a tradition or rebuff efforts to reform it, that
counts as evidence in favor of traditional understandings. If
those institutions, on the other hand, question a tradition or
reform it in part, then that reform counts as evidence against
traditional understandings or (more typically) as evidence that
traditional understandings should be recalibrated in some way.
Tradition as democratic deliberation might sound out of place
in judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution, but consider
72. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 194-228 (discussing the new "politics of
preservation" responding to the freedom of choice and gay-rights social move-
ments); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 443 (1995) (discussing the rise of citizen militias and a new politics of guns
responding to ever-expanding governmental regulation).
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the following argument. Important institutions and practices of
governance as well as many fundamental values in the United
States are enshrined not in the Constitution's texts or precedents,
but rather in state and federal statutes. Family law and voting
rules are two examples. These regimes of governance and norms
exist within the framework of the Constitution, of course, but it
is not unusual for statutory pressures to influence the Supreme
Court's understanding of the Constitution. 73 Should not legisla-
tive investigations, reports, statutes, and other actions contribute
to the Court's constitutional common law? 74
Tradition as democratic deliberation helps us appreciate why
the Bowers Justices were not willing to protect "homosexual sod-
omy" as a privacy right in 1986. Although nineteenth-century
sodomy laws had nothing to say about oral sex between two
men, between 1879 and 1935 legislatures all over America delib-
erated the matter and concluded that oral sex was similar to tra-
ditional sodomy-anal sex-because it was sex for pleasure
alone and therefore was morally abominable for the same reason
as anal sex.75 Then, through the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, state legislatures and local police departments focused
enforcement of updated sodomy laws on a highly disfavored
minority, "homosexuals," men whose incapacity for procrea-
tive marriage raised suspicions of predatory natures and whose
cruising in public places created concerns for nuisance and cor-
ruption. 76 Although half the states repealed their consensual
sodomy laws between 1961 and 1986, most of the repeals were
carried off by sneaking sodomy reform below public radar as
part of the Model Penal Code's modernization of criminal
73. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1959) (rejecting claim that state literacy tests unconstitutionally burden black
people's right to vote), with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334, 337
(1966) (upholding Congress's authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment
through suspension of literacy tests in the South).
74. This is the argument of WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A RE-
PUBLIC OF STATUTES (forthcoming 2009).
75. ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 50-55.
76. Id. at 73-108 (the anti-homosexual "Kulturkampf," or campaign of discipline
and erasure); John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in
Cold War America, in PASSION & POWER: SEXUALITY IN HISTORY 227 (Kathy Peiss &
Christina Simmons eds., 1989). See generally DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER
SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (2004).
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law.77 Only in California did the legislature openly debate the
pro-gay implications and still opt for sodomy reform (1975);
two other states (Idaho, 1972, and Arkansas, 1977) reinstated
their consensual sodomy laws when the media alerted them to
the gay rights implications. 78 The District of Columbia repealed
its consensual sodomy law in 1981, a move that was vetoed by
the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, 281 to
119. 79 AIDS-phobia after 1981 made homosexual sodomy even
more indefensible for most Americans. Between the Stonewall
riots of 1969 and the peak of the AIDS epidemic, around 1990,
nine states revoked criminal sanctions for consensual hetero-
sexual sodomy but left homosexual sodomy a crime, precisely
the line that Justice White drew in Bowers. 0 In Reagan-era
America, the democratic process had, decidedly, not embraced
the idea that "homosexuals" deserve the same privacy protec-
tions as heterosexuals. And neither did the Supreme Court.
Tradition as democratic deliberation, moreover, provides a
legal basis for distinguishing Lawrence from Bowers. Public
opinion underwent a sea change between Bowers in 1986 and
Lawrence in 2003, as the sense that AIDS was the homosexuals'
Trojan Horse receded and as many Americans came, instead, to
understand lesbians and gay men as ordinary neighbors and
coworkers, often with partners and families. 81 Once it became
clear that consensual sodomy, like penile-vaginal intercourse,
could be the basis for committed family relationships, it was
much harder to deny gay people the privacy rights accorded
straight people in the contraception, abortion, and interracial-
sexuality cases. 82 Twelve states abandoned their consensual
77. ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 118-27 (during Illinois's sodomy repeal, homo-
sexuality was almost completely in the closet); id. at 144-47 (sodomy reform in the
1960s failed when legislators detected the pro-homosexual effect); id. at 176-84
(substantial progress in repeal of consensual sodomy laws, in large part because
the repeal was enveloped in adoption of the Model Penal Code).
78. See id. at 197-201 (California repeal); id. at 182-84, 388-89 (Idaho and Arkan-
sas reenact consensual sodomy laws after "mistaken" repeals were exposed).
79. Id. at 213-18.
80. Arkansas, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Ten-
nessee, and Texas. See id. at 387-407 (appendix of state sodomy laws).
81. The most dramatic movement in opinion polls came between 1990 and 1995.
See Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 234, 236-37 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (surveying public
opinion polls); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 267-68 (similar).
82. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 269-78.
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sodomy laws between 1986 and 2003, as did the District of Co-
lumbia in 1994, with nary a peep out of Congress.8 3 Although
state legislatures and voters were rejecting same-sex marriage
all over the country in statutes and some constitutional
amendments, there was virtually no public interest in reviving
consensual sodomy laws. By the time the issue returned to the
Supreme Court, in Lawrence, it was all over but the shouting.
How about Heller? As Stephen Halbrook has demonstrated,
congressional deliberation and action is surprisingly illuminat-
ing.84 In 1892, Congress made it a crime in the District of Colum-
bia (over which Congress has plenary jurisdiction) to carry a con-
cealed pistol, except in one's business and "dwelling house."
8 5
Permits for carrying concealed weapons in public were available
for "necessary self-defense."86 A brief legislative discussion
suggested that Senators were sensitive to citizens' "natural
right to carry the arms which are necessary to secure their per-
sons and their lives." 7 In 1906, Congress authorized the Dis-
trict itself to enact "all such usual and reasonable police regula-
tions.., as they may deem necessary for the regulation of
firearms," 8 but continued to enact its own measures.
In 1932, Congress enacted a comprehensive firearms law for
the District. 89 Section 3 of the 1932 Act barred anyone convicted
of a violent crime from possessing a pistol in the District.9" Sec-
tion 4 prohibited anyone in the District from carrying a con-
cealed pistol without a license, "except in his dwelling house or
83. See id. at 269-74, 289-98 (state-by-state analysis of sodomy law repeal, 1992
to 2000); see also id. at 387-407 (appendix).
84. See generally Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of the United States Senate,
the President of the United States Senate, and 250 Members of United States
House of Representatives in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (authored by Stephen P. Halbrook);
Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a
Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597
(1995) [hereinafter Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment].
85. Act of July 13, 1892, ch. 159, 27 Stat. 116.
86. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 855, 31 Stat. 1328.
87. 23 CONG. REC. 5788 (1892) (statement of Senator Mills, objecting to the pro-
posed bill); id. at 5789 (statement of Senator Wolcott, defending the bill as consis-
tent with "the constitutional right of any citizen who desires to obey the law").
88. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3932, § 4, Pub. L. No. 59-401, 34 Stat. 808, 809 (codi-
fied as amended at D.C. CODE § 1-303.43 (2001)).
89. Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, Pub. L. No. 72-275, 47 Stat. 650.
90. Id. § 3, 47 Stat. at 651.
[Vol. 32
HeinOnline  -- 32 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 214 2009
Sodomy and Guns
place of business or on other land possessed by him."
91 Section
14 prohibited anyone in the District from possessing a "ma-
chine gun, sawed-off shotgun," or other dangerous weapons;
there was no dwelling-house exception for that rule.
92 The 1932
Act remains in effect, as amended by Congress and later sup-
plemented by laws enacted by the District of Columbia Coun-
cil, such as the statutory restrictions invalidated in Heller.
93
Legislators also crafted national firearms legislation in re-
sponse to a growing problem of dangerous use by criminals
and malefactors. Congress in 1927 prohibited mail delivery of
"pistols, revolvers, and other firearms capable of being con-
cealed on the person,"94 and in 1934 prohibited the possession
of sawed-off shotguns and machine guns, 95 the law upheld in
Miller.96 The Second Amendment was not emphasized in these
debates, but neither did Congress regulate possession of hand-
guns for self-defense in the home. At the same time Americans
were becoming accustomed to great amounts of government
regulation, they were also becoming more jealous of retaining
private spaces unregulated by the government. Following both
tradition and practicality, the home was the natural situs for
such a locational understanding of privacy.
This balance between public safety and private sanctuary
was explicit in the Property Requisition Act of 1941, 97 enacted
on the eve of Pearl Harbor. The Act authorized the President to
requisition private property for national defense purposes, but
Congress stipulated that the Act not be construed "to authorize
the requisitioning or require the registration of any firearms
possessed by any individual for his personal protection or
sport" or "to impair or infringe in any manner the right of any
91. Id. § 4, 47 Stat. at 651. A license could be granted to anyone showing "good
reason to fear injury to his person or property." Id. § 6. The committee reports
briefly noted that "[t]he right of an individual to possess a pistol in his home, or
on land belonging to him, is not dist[ur]bed by the bill." S. REP. No. 72-575, at 3
(1932); accord H.R. REP. NO. 72-767, at 2 (1932).
92. Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, § 14, 47 Stat. at 654.
93. Congressional amendments include Act of Nov. 4, 1943, ch. 296, Pub. L. No. 78-
182, 57 Stat. 586, and Act of June 29, 1953, ch. 159, Pub L. No. 83-85, 67 Stat. 90, 93-94.
94. Act of Feb. 8, 1927, ch. 75, Pub. L. No. 69-583, 44 Stat. 1059.
95. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2000)).
96. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
97. Act of Oct. 16, 1941, ch. 445, Pub. L. No. 77-274, 55 Stat. 742.
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individual to keep and bear arms."9 8 There was a fair amount
of debate over requisitioning or registration of firearms, and a
number of Representatives and a few Senators from the more
rural southern and border states insisted upon these caveats for
Second Amendment reasons.99 Although hunting was repeat-
edly mentioned, the primary justification was the one made by
Representative Hall of New York: A hallmark of totalitarian
regimes (Communist Russia and Nazi Germany) was disarm-
ing citizens; to distinguish our liberty-protecting constitutional-
ism from theirs, Congress ought to assure the individual's right
to "the private ownership of firearms and the right to use weap-
ons in the protection of his home, and thereby his country." 100
The Gun Control Act of 1968101 established what is now our
primary national regime for firearm regulation. This is a broad
and "infringing" regime, but Congress rejected proposals for
nationwide registration of handguns, and the 1968 Act is nota-
ble for not regulating gun ownership by law-abiding citizens
for self-defense. Section 101 of the statute says that "it is not the
purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal
restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to
the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to
the purpose of hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, personal
protection, or any other lawful activity."102 Although this is the
sort of cheap talk Congress often engages in for political pur-
poses, it does explain the regulatory choices made in the statute
Congress enacted. Indeed, in the Firearms Owners' Protection
Act of 1986,103 Congress amended the 1968 Act in minor ways
to further protect "the rights of citizens to keep and bear arms
under the second amendment." 104
None of these legislative materials was even cited by Justice
Scalia in his Heller opinion for the Court, but it is apparent that
the precise contours of the constitutional right Justice Scalia
98. Id. § 1, 55 Stat. at 742.
99. See Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment, supra note 84, at 623-
31 (collecting quotations from various legislators).
100. 87 CONG. REC. 6778 (1941).
101. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 note).
102. Id. § 101, 82 Stat. at 1213-14.
103. Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
104. Id. § 1(b)(1)(A), 100 Stat. at 449; see also id. § 107, 100 Stat. at 460 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 926A) (preempting state laws barring interstate travel with lawful
firearms).
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says he "discovered" in the original meaning of the Second
Amendment came instead from twentieth-century congres-
sional and presidential consensus. Yet Justice Scalia kept these
more recent sources in his constitutional closet, suggesting that
he was not willing to make any kind of evolving-constitutional-
meaning argument. But it is a superior argument to the original-
meaning argument Justice Scalia tried to run. The twentieth-
century materials suggest the possibility of a rough consensus in
American law that Congress (and by extension the District of
Columbia) may not bar law-abiding citizens from keeping hand-
guns in their homes for self-defense purposes. This norm is one
that Congress has repeatedly followed in legislation for the Dis-
trict and for the nation, that most recent Presidents have en-
dorsed, and that the Supreme Court did not address in Miller
or its earlier decisions.
In short, if I could be persuaded to read the Second Amend-
ment dynamically to create a right independent of the militia
context, I would end up with something very close to Justice
Scalia's limitations on that right. It is also worth noting that a
dynamic approach to tradition also suggests a statutory solu-
tion to the problem addressed in Heller. A superior route to the
Heller result, from a legal point of view, would be a statutory
argument of the following sort: Congress has plenary authority
over the District of Columbia. In a 1906 umbrella statute, Con-
gress exercised that authority to allow the District to enact "all
such usual and reasonable police regulations.., as they may
deem necessary for the regulation of firearms, projectiles, ex-
plosives, or weapons of any kind in the District of Colum-
bia." 1°5 In light of Congress's 1932 Act and other statutes sur-
veyed above, the District's regulation of home use of firearms
is neither "usual" nor "reasonable" under the 1906 statute.106
This would have resolved the case in a more rigorous legal
way, would have protected the norm, and would have re-
spected precedent as well as original meaning.
105. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3932, § 4, Pub. L. No. 59-401, 34 Stat. 808, 809 (codi-
fied as amended at D.C. CODE § 1-303.43 (2001)).
106. The Supreme Court has authority to construe both congressional statutes
relating to the District and the District's own statutes.
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CONCLUSION
I have argued that tradition itself has more than one meaning
and several plausible methodologies in constitutional cases. My
goal is to insist upon historiographical accuracy and nuance-an
insistence that undermines the utility of tradition as evidence of
original meaning. If tradition itself evolves and if multiple tradi-
tions bear on a constitutional issue, my notion of tradition as on-
going democratic deliberation best addresses concerns that un-
accountable judges will cherry-pick "tradition" to impose their
values onto the Constitution.
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